

Online Supplemental Appendix for: The Effect of Source of
Income Policies on Recipients of Non-Voucher Categories of
Protected Income

APPENDIX

This appendix provides additional technical details and robustness checks for “The Effect of Source of Income Policies on Recipients of Non-Voucher Categories of Protected Income.”

OSA Table 1 *Mobility Effects of SOI Policies for Alternative Samples of Renters*

	(1) SSI $\geq$ 50%	(2) Near-Poverty (150% of PL)	(3) Social Security $\geq$ 50%
Panel A: Event Study Estimates			
$t = -3$	-0.029 (0.026)	-0.003 (0.016)	-0.024** (0.012)
$t = -2$	-0.011 (0.026)	-0.010 (0.014)	-0.016 (0.012)
$t = -1$	-0.037 (0.024)	-0.012 (0.014)	-0.007 (0.013)
$t = 1$	-0.002 (0.017)	-0.003 (0.010)	0.008 (0.010)
$t = 2$	0.014 (0.017)	-0.009 (0.009)	0.007 (0.010)
$t = 3$	-0.005 (0.017)	0.001 (0.010)	0.003 (0.009)
Panel B: Post-Treatment Average Effect			
Source of Income Policy	0.002 (0.013)	-0.003 (0.008)	0.006 (0.008)
Pre-Treatment Joint Sig. Test P-Value	0.412	0.796	0.194
Observations	12,160	12,160	12,160
Mean(Outcome)	0.201	0.306	0.166

Notes: Sample comprises American Community Survey (ACS) data aggregated to the Consistent Public Use Microdata Area (ConsPUMA)-by-year level from 2006 to 2021 using person-level weights. In Column (1), sample is restricted to individuals for whom Supplemental Security Income (SSI) contributes 50% or more of their total personal income who also report *no* income from other welfare payments; in Column (2) sample is restricted to rent-burdened individuals with incomes below $1.5\times$ the poverty line; in Column (3), sample is restricted to individuals for whom Social Security income contributes 50% or more to their total personal income who report no payments from SSI or welfare. The reported sample size is based on the same event-study treatment panel described in the main-text Empirical Strategy section: $N=12,160$ ConsPUMA-year cells. All specifications include ConsPUMA and year fixed effects and the time-varying covariates listed in the notes for main-text Table 3. Standard errors clustered at the ConsPUMA level are reported in parentheses. Sources: American Community Survey microdata via Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) USA (Ruggles et al., 2025); SOI policy enactment data compiled from Poverty & Race Research Action Council (2026).

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

An Alternative No-Voucher-Proxy Sample

The two main-text likely-affected samples (any protected income (PI) and 50% or more PI) are constructed from self-reported SSI and welfare income in the ACS. Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) reciprocity is not separately reported in the ACS, so these samples may include individuals who both receive PI from SSI or welfare *and* participate in the HCV program. This section reports parallel mobility estimates for an alternative sample of likely-affected renters who appear less likely to receive vouchers. The sample consists of adult renters with incomes below the poverty line and rent burdens of 41% or more. The HCV program requires recipients to pay 30% of their income towards monthly rent while vouchers cover the balance up to a specified limit; families may elect to exceed this limit, but their rent burden must be 40% or less when they begin a lease (Ellen, 2020). The sample therefore includes individuals in poverty whose rent burden indicates they are less likely to receive HCVs than comparable renters in poverty with lower rent burdens.¹

The sample is necessarily an indirect proxy because it captures voucher non-reciprocity only on average and at the population level, and likely contains both renters with no HCV exposure and renters who voluntarily exceeded the 40% threshold for reasons unrelated to vouchers. Estimates from this sample should therefore be read alongside the main-text estimates rather than as a substitute for direct HCV-status identification. Cell sizes are reported in the Sample Structure and Unit of Inference section below; this sample has the largest median cell size of the three likely-affected samples.

OSA Table 2 reports the mobility estimates for the no-voucher-proxy sample. As in the two main-text samples, the joint significance test of pre-treatment coefficients fails to reject the null, and the post-treatment average effect is small and statistically indistinguishable from zero (point estimate -0.002 , standard error 0.011). As in the main-text samples, this null pattern is interpreted as evidence against large aggregate changes in observed survey margins rather than as evidence on the application-stage and subgroup-specific channels discussed in the Identification Assumptions section below.

OSA Table 8 reports the precision of the post-treatment average effect from the same specification. The mobility estimate is precise enough to rule out increases above 5.9%, the tightest precision bound across the three likely-affected samples. OSA Table 9 reports the corresponding attenuation sensitivity exercise; under the disclosure-rate scaling assumptions used elsewhere, the bound on a hypothetical disclose-only effect ranges from 5.9% (full disclosure) to 11.8% (50% disclosure).


¹Applying this rent-burden restriction to the PI sample yields limited data availability across ConsPUMA-year cells. Conditioning on poverty status rather than reported PI reciprocity also captures individuals who received but did not report public assistance to the ACS.

OSA Table 2 *SOI Policies and Mobility for the No-Voucher-Proxy Sample*

	(1) Poverty + Rent Burden
Panel A: Event Study Estimates	
$t = -3$	-0.004 (0.019)
$t = -2$	-0.014 (0.016)
$t = -1$	-0.025 (0.017)
$t = 1$	-0.006 (0.013)
$t = 2$	-0.007 (0.013)
$t = 3$	0.006 (0.013)
Panel B: Post-Treatment Average Effect	
Source of Income Policy	-0.002 (0.011)
Pre-Treatment Joint Sig. Test P-Value	0.484
Observations	12,160
Mean(Outcome)	0.317

Notes: Sample comprises adult renters in poverty with rent burdens of 41% or more, aggregated to the ConsPUMA-by-year level from 2006 to 2021 using person-level weights. The reported sample size is based on the same event-study treatment panel described in the main-text Empirical Strategy section: N=12,160 ConsPUMA-year cells. The specification follows the main-text Eq. (1), with ConsPUMA and year fixed effects and the same ConsPUMA-level time-varying covariates as in main-text Table 3 (employment rate, poverty rate, and shares of the renter population that are non-white, high-school graduates, and over the age of 65). Standard errors clustered at the ConsPUMA level are reported in parentheses. Sources: American Community Survey microdata via IPUMS USA (Ruggles et al., 2025); SOI policy enactment data compiled from Poverty & Race Research Action Council (2026).

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.



OSA Figure 1 *SOI Policies and Mobility, No-Voucher-Proxy Sample.* Event-study estimates corresponding to main-text Eq. (1) for the no-voucher-proxy sample described in Table 2 above. The estimation sample matches Table 2 (N=12,160 ConsPUMA-year cells). Vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered at the ConsPUMA level. Sources: American Community Survey microdata via IPUMS USA (Ruggles et al., 2025); SOI policy enactment data compiled from Poverty & Race Research Action Council (2026).

Attenuation Sensitivity under Imperfect Disclosure

The intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates reported in the main text capture the average effect of SOI policy enactment on realized housing outcomes for likely-affected renters in a given ConsPUMA-year, regardless of whether each renter searched for a new unit, submitted a rental application, or would have disclosed protected income on a rental application. This estimand is appropriate for measuring population-scale changes in the housing margins observable in the ACS, but it will mechanically attenuate effects that operate only through the subgroup of renters who disclose protected income and are thereby exposed to application-stage SOI discrimination. No publicly available survey records both protected-income receipt and rental-application disclosure behavior, so the disclosure share among likely-affected renters cannot be directly observed.

OSA Table 3 illustrates this attenuation arithmetically. The maximum policy effect ruled out by the precision of the ITT estimates from main-text Table 4 is divided by hypothetical disclosure shares ranging from 50% to 100%. The exercise is mechanical because the ITT precision bound is rescaled by an assumed scalar and not re-estimated. The resulting figures are not estimates of an effect on the treated. Recovering such an effect would also require the assumption that disclosers are otherwise exchangeable with non-disclosers. Instead, the table describes the implied bound on a hypothetical disclose-only effect under each posited disclosure share. The exercise clarifies how a non-disclosure margin could in principle reconcile null aggregate ITT estimates with non-trivial responses among renters who do disclose.

OSA Table 3 *Attenuation Sensitivity of ITT Bounds under Hypothetical Disclosure Shares*


Implied Effect Sizes under Alternative Income Disclosure Scenarios				
	Hypothetical Disclosure Share			
	50%	75%	90%	100%
Any PI	26.2%	17.5%	14.6%	13.1%
PI $\geq$ 50%	21.0%	14.0%	11.7%	10.5%

Notes: The maximum implied-effect bound (in percentage terms) from main-text Table 4 is rescaled by a hypothetical disclosure share, defined as the assumed proportion of likely-affected renters who disclose protected income on a rental application. N=12,160 ConsPUMA-year cells in the event-study treatment panel. The exercise is mechanical and does not estimate an effect on the treated. The corresponding figures for the no-voucher-proxy sample are reported in OSA Tables 8 and 9 below. Sources: American Community Survey microdata via IPUMS USA (Ruggles et al., 2025); SOI policy data from Poverty & Race Research Action Council (2026).

Documenting Source of Income (SOI) Policies

OSA Figure 2 maps the spatial distribution of SOI policies across the contiguous United States as of the end of 2024, with policies mapped to the Consistent Public Use Microdata Area (ConsPUMA) level. Treated ConsPUMAs are filled in solid black; untreated ConsPUMAs are unshaded. OSA

Table 4 lists SOI policies enacted during the 2006 to 2021 time period considered by this study, at the state, county, and city levels. OSA Table 5 lists all SOI policies that were enacted prior to 2006 by jurisdiction type.



OSA Figure 2 *SOI Policies Enacted as of 2024.* Source of income (SOI) policies enacted as of 2024, mapped to Consistent Public Use Microdata Areas (ConsPUMAs). The map shows the N=1,066 ConsPUMAs in the contiguous United States; 620 are treated and 446 are untreated as of 2024. The 12 Alaska and Hawaii ConsPUMAs included in the analysis sample are omitted from the map for display purposes. Treated ConsPUMAs are filled in solid black; untreated ConsPUMAs are unshaded. OSA Tables 4 and 5 list policies used in the 2006 to 2021 analysis window. Sources: SOI policy enactment data compiled from Poverty & Race Research Action Council (2026); ConsPUMA boundaries from Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) USA (Ruggles et al., 2025); jurisdiction-to-PUMA population shares from Missouri Census Data Center (Missouri Census Data Center, 2014).

A number of jurisdictions have experienced changes to their SOI policies over time. In particular, jurisdictions have added or removed Housing Choice Vouchers (HCV) as a protected source of income as a result of judicial review or subsequent amendments. For the purposes of this analysis, a jurisdiction is considered treated by an SOI policy if any such policy is enacted, regardless of the specific treatment of HCVs. As a result, the classification of a given jurisdiction's SOI policy and the timing of its enactment may vary from the broader SOI literature, which focuses specifically on HCV recipients. California enacted an SOI policy in 1999, effective in 2000, which did not cover HCVs; HCV was added to this broader policy in 2019. Similarly, Delaware implemented an SOI policy in 2016 which did not cover HCVs, with a subsequent amendment adding HCVs to the policy slated to go into effect in 2026. In both cases, each state is considered treated by its initial SOI policy enactment. Minnesota's 1990 SOI policy covered HCVs until 2010, when HCV protections were removed as a result of judicial review. Several states have passed state-level legislation

specifically preempting local SOI policies. Texas passed such legislation in 2015. Austin adopted a local SOI ordinance in 2014 that became effective in 2015 and was preempted in that same year; Dallas adopted a local ordinance in 2016 after the state preemption. Both local ordinances are listed in OSA Table 4 as policy enactments, but neither creates treated ConsPUMA-years in the analysis. While outside the time period considered by this study, both Florida and Iowa implemented similar legislation in 2023.

OSA Table 4 *SOI Policies Enacted between 2006 and 2021*

Jurisdiction Type	Jurisdiction	State	Enactment Year
<i>State-Level</i>	Oregon	.	2013
	Delaware	.	2016
	Washington	.	2018
	New York	.	2019
	Colorado	.	2020
	Maryland	.	2020
	Virginia	.	2020
	Rhode Island	.	2021
<i>County-Level</i>	Nassau	New York	2006
	King	Washington	2006
	Miami-Dade	Florida	2009
	Frederick	Maryland	2009
	Cook	Illinois	2013
	Westchester	New York	2013
	Suffolk	New York	2015
	Marin	California	2017
	Santa Clara	California	2017
	Broward	Florida	2017
	Denver	Colorado	2018
	Erie	New York	2018
	Alachua	Florida	2019
	Anne Arundel	Maryland	2019
	Baltimore	Maryland	2019
	Prince George's	Maryland	2019
	Hillsborough	Florida	2021
<i>City-Level</i>	Buffalo	New York	2006
	Ripon	Wisconsin	2007
	Sun Prairie	Wisconsin	2007

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Jurisdiction Type	Jurisdiction	State	Enactment Year
	Detroit	Michigan	2008
	New York	New York	2008
	Lorain	Ohio	2008
	Harwood Heights	Illinois	2009
	Annapolis	Maryland	2009
	Wickliffe	Ohio	2009
	Cambridge	Wisconsin	2010
	Linndale	Ohio	2012
	University Heights	Ohio	2012
	Warrensville Heights	Ohio	2012
	Redmond	Washington	2012
	Royal Oak	Michigan	2013
	Kirkland	Washington	2013
	Austin	Texas	2014
	Santa Monica	California	2015
	Iowa City	Iowa	2015
	St. Louis	Missouri	2015
	South Euclid	Ohio	2015
	Pittsburgh	Pennsylvania	2015
	Vancouver	Washington	2015
	Oak Park	Illinois	2016
	Syracuse	New York	2016
	Dallas	Texas	2016
	Renton	Washington	2016
	Berkeley	California	2017
	Westland	Michigan	2017
	Minneapolis	Minnesota	2017
	Rochester	New York	2017
	Kent	Washington	2017
	Spokane	Washington	2017
	Fairfax	California	2018
	Novato	California	2018
	San Anselmo	California	2018
	San Diego	California	2018
	San Rafael	California	2018
	Woodland	California	2018

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Jurisdiction Type	Jurisdiction	State	Enactment Year
	Boulder	Colorado	2018
	Jackson	Michigan	2018
	Kentwood	Michigan	2018
	Wyoming	Michigan	2018
	Bellingham	Washington	2018
	Alameda	California	2019
	Los Angeles	California	2019
	Milpitas	California	2019
	San Jose	California	2019
	Des Moines	Iowa	2019
	Baltimore	Maryland	2019
	Clayton	Missouri	2019
	Webster Groves	Missouri	2019
	Gainesville	Florida	2020
	Naperville	Illinois	2020
	Louisville	Kentucky	2020
	Portland	Maine	2020
	Holland	Michigan	2020
	Kalamazoo	Michigan	2020
	Bexley	Ohio	2020
	Toledo	Ohio	2020
	Daytona Beach	Florida	2021
	St. Petersburg	Florida	2021
	Ferndale	Michigan	2021
	Hazel Park	Michigan	2021
	Oak Park	Michigan	2021
	Akron	Ohio	2021
	Athens	Ohio	2021
	Cleveland Heights	Ohio	2021
	Columbus	Ohio	2021
	Reynoldsburg	Ohio	2021
	Westerville	Ohio	2021
	Whitehall	Ohio	2021
	Worthington	Ohio	2021
	Yellow Springs	Ohio	2021
	Providence	Rhode Island	2021

Notes: Source of income (SOI) laws enacted between 2006 and 2021 by jurisdiction type (N=100 policies). Sources: SOI

policy enactment data compiled from Poverty & Race Research Action Council (2026); verified against Bell et al. (2018) and Teles and Su (2022).

OSA Table 5 *SOI Policies Enacted Prior to 2006*

Jurisdiction Type	Jurisdictions with SOI Policies
<i>State-Level</i>	Massachusetts; Maine; Wisconsin; North Dakota; Oklahoma; Vermont; Connecticut; Minnesota; Utah; California; New Jersey; District of Columbia
<i>County-Level</i>	Dane, WI; Montgomery, MD; Howard, MD; Milwaukee, WI
<i>City-Level</i>	Madison, WI; Ann Arbor, MI; West Seneca, NY; Boston, MA; Cincinnati, OH; Philadelphia, PA; Olympia, WA; Lansing, MI; Wauwatosa, WI; Seattle, WA; Chicago, IL; Bellevue, WA; Cambridge, MA; Quincy, MA; State College, PA; Revere, MA; Wheeling, IL; Urbana, IL; San Francisco, CA; Wilmington, DE; Corte Madera, CA; East Palo Alto, CA; Marion, IA; Grand Rapids, MI; Frederick, MD; East Lansing, MI; Memphis, TN; Mill Valley, CA; Hamburg, NY

Notes: Source of income (SOI) laws enacted prior to 2006 by jurisdiction type (N=45 policies). Sources: SOI policy enactment data compiled from Poverty & Race Research Action Council (2026); verified against Bell et al. (2018) and Teles and Su (2022).

The panels of main-text Table 1 (the SOI summary statistics table) report distinct quantities. Panel A reports the cumulative count of SOI policy enactments through 2021, including policies enacted at any point in the historical record. Panel B disaggregates the cumulative count by enactment-year bin, including a combined row for 2020–2021 enactments and a row for pre-2006 (always-treated) policies. Panel C reports policies enacted from 2008 to 2019 by jurisdiction type, the enactment window over which the post-treatment event-study coefficients are estimated. Policies enacted in 2020 or 2021 do not appear in Panel C because fewer than three post-treatment years are observed within the sample window; they are reported in Panel B’s 2020–2021 row. Panel D reports cumulative counts of treated ConsPUMAs at two snapshots in time, as of 2006 and as of 2021. These are stocks, not flows, so they are not additive, and the larger 2021 figure subsumes the 2006 figure. The total ConsPUMA count in Panel D is the full ConsPUMA panel. Panel E reports the estimated likely-affected renter population residing in treated ConsPUMAs at the two snapshots.

Event-Study Estimator

All results produced in the main text use the robust estimator developed by de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfœuille (2024), referred to as dCDH in the discussion below. The dCDH estimator addresses concerns about the estimation of event-study and difference-in-differences style research designs via Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). This section summarizes important features of the dCDH estimator.

The dCDH estimator calculates event-study effects as weighted averages of “clean” difference-in-differences comparisons. For each event-time j , the estimator compares the outcome evolution of units whose treatment changed (“switchers”) to units with the same baseline treatment whose treatment has not yet changed (control units). Unlike traditional OLS event-study specifications, which can inadvertently use already-treated units as controls for newly-treated units (leading to bias when treatment effects vary across groups or over time), the dCDH estimator explicitly compares each switching unit only to not-yet-treated units with the same baseline treatment status. This approach avoids the problematic comparisons that can contaminate OLS estimates in staggered adoption settings (Goodman-Bacon, 2021). Additionally, the estimator is designed to handle settings where treatment can switch both on and off over time, which is particularly important in this setting because SOI policies have been removed via judicial review and state legislation.

As with other event-study estimators, credible causal inference with the dCDH approach requires an identifying assumption about the counterfactual trajectory of Y in the absence of treatment. In this setting, the identifying assumption is that ConsPUMAs with the same baseline treatment status (either with or without an SOI policy enacted) would have experienced parallel outcome trends if they had all maintained their baseline treatment status (i.e., parallel trends conditional on baseline treatment). This assumption can be assessed using a joint significance test of the pre-treatment event-study estimates, which compare outcome changes of to-be-treated units with their control groups before any treatment occurs. Each event-study table in the main text re-

ports these pre-treatment estimates alongside a joint test of their statistical significance to evaluate the credibility of this identifying assumption.

Identification Assumptions for Intent-to-Treat Estimates

The event-study estimates reported in the main text recover ITT effects of SOI policy enactment on the average outcome of likely-affected renters in a given ConsPUMA-year. Recovering a credible ITT effect under the dCDH estimator described in the Event-Study Estimator section above requires four practical assumptions, each discussed in turn below.

Conditional parallel trends. ConsPUMAs that eventually adopt an SOI policy would, in the absence of the policy, follow the same average outcome trajectory as ConsPUMAs that do not adopt one (after conditioning on baseline treatment status and the time-varying covariates included in Eq. (1)). The pre-treatment event-time coefficients reported alongside each main-text estimate provide a test of this assumption. Across the mobility specifications, the joint test of pre-treatment coefficients fails to reject the null of no differential pre-trend at conventional levels.

No anticipation. Outcomes among likely-affected renters in to-be-treated ConsPUMAs are assumed to be unaffected by the policy in years preceding its enactment. SOI policies are enacted through state legislative or local council processes that often span months between proposal and effective date, but the absence of differential pre-trends is consistent with no detectable anticipation effect at the ConsPUMA-year level over a 3-year pre-treatment window.

Stable Unit Treatment Value (SUTVA) and limited spillovers. Outcomes in a given ConsPUMA-year are assumed to depend on that ConsPUMA's own treatment status rather than the treatment status of other ConsPUMAs. While geographic spillovers cannot be ruled out, two features limit this concern. First, ConsPUMAs are large geographic units, with a median 2010 population of approximately 157,000. Second, the event-study comparison set is drawn from a national panel with many untreated and not-yet-treated ConsPUMAs, rather than only from immediately adjacent housing markets.

Stable definition of treatment. An "SOI policy" is defined consistently across jurisdictions and time, regardless of the specific protected categories named in the underlying statute. The Documenting Source of Income Policies section above describes the relevant amendments and judicial-review changes to SOI scope, including the addition or removal of HCV coverage in particular jurisdictions. Because this analysis focuses on non-HCV protected income, the inclusion of HCV in a given jurisdiction's SOI policy does not affect the relevance of the policy for the populations studied here.

Sample Structure and Unit of Inference

All event-study estimates reported in the main text and appendix are produced at the ConsPUMA-by-year level rather than the individual renter level. American Community Survey (ACS)

microdata for adult renters are first restricted to the relevant likely-affected sample, then collapsed to ConsPUMA-by-year cells using ACS person-level weights for individual outcomes and household-level weights for household outcomes. The full descriptive panel covers 1,078 ConsPUMAs across 16 years for 17,248 ConsPUMA-year cells. The event-study tables report the treatment panel used for the baseline specifications, which consists of 760 ConsPUMAs observed across 16 years, or 12,160 ConsPUMA-year cells, after excluding ConsPUMAs already treated in 2006. Unit-of-inference statements in the main text refer to inference at the ConsPUMA-year level given the underlying ACS-weighted aggregates, not at the renter level.

OSA Table 6 reports cell-size diagnostics for the two main-text likely-affected samples (any PI and 50% or more PI) and the no-voucher-proxy sample. For each sample, the table reports the count of ConsPUMA-year cells with at least one in-sample observation, the split between ever-treated and never-treated ConsPUMAs, the distribution of underlying unweighted ACS observation counts per cell, and the median ACS-weighted population estimate per cell. Cell counts are large enough across all three samples to support ConsPUMA-by-year aggregation as the unit of analysis.

OSA Table 6 *ConsPUMA-by-Year Cell-Size Diagnostics across Likely-Affected Samples*

	All Adult Renters	Likely-Affected Subsamples		
		Any PI	PI $\geq$ 50%	Poverty + Rent Burden
<i>Panel A: ConsPUMA-by-Year Cells</i>				
Total cells with ≥ 1 observation	17,248	17,216	17,057	17,229
Cells in ever-treated ConsPUMAs	9,120	9,095	8,987	9,102
Cells in never-treated ConsPUMAs	8,128	8,121	8,070	8,127
<i>Panel B: Distribution of ACS Observations per Cell</i>				
Mean	514	39	25	78
10th percentile	138	7	4	14
25th percentile	186	12	7	24
Median	293	23	14	43
75th percentile	546	43	27	86
90th percentile	1,002	84	54	164
<i>Panel C: Median Weighted Population per Cell</i>				
Median sum of person-weights	37,908	2,667	1,648	5,613

Notes: Diagnostics are computed from ACS person-level microdata (2006–2021) restricted to adult renters and aggregated to the ConsPUMA-by-year level. “Any PI” restricts to renters with positive protected income from SSI or welfare; “PI $\geq$ 50%” restricts to renters for whom protected income accounts for 50% or more of total personal income; “Poverty + Rent Burden” restricts to renters in poverty with rent burdens of 41% or more (the no-voucher-proxy sample). Counts of ACS observations in Panel B are unweighted. The full descriptive panel contains N=17,248 ConsPUMA-year cells. Sources: American Community Survey microdata via IPUMS USA (Ruggles et al., 2025); SOI policy enactment data compiled from Poverty & Race Research Action Council (2026).

Covariate Specification

All event-study specifications in the main text and OSA use the same ConsPUMA-by-year covariates. These are the renter-population employment and poverty rates and the renter-population shares of non-white residents, high-school graduates, and residents over the age of 65. The covariates are computed from the broader ACS renter population rather than the likely-affected sample, which captures local renter-market composition while keeping the specification comparable across the any PI, 50% or more PI, and no-voucher-proxy samples. They are also slow-moving relative to within-ConsPUMA SOI policy timing. OSA Table 7 shows that omitting these covariates does not materially change the main mobility estimates.

OSA Table 7 *Mobility Estimates without Time-Varying Covariates*

	(1) Any PI	(2) PI $\geq$ 50%
Panel A: Event Study Estimates		
$t = -3$	-0.003 (0.016)	-0.022 (0.024)
$t = -2$	0.002 (0.014)	-0.001 (0.022)
$t = -1$	-0.022 (0.018)	-0.028 (0.024)
$t = 1$	0.015 (0.013)	-0.001 (0.016)
$t = 2$	0.010 (0.013)	0.006 (0.014)
$t = 3$	0.001 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.015)
Panel B: Post-Treatment Average Effect		
Source of Income Policy	0.009 (0.011)	-0.002 (0.012)
Pre-Treatment Joint Sig. Test P-Value	0.512	0.550
Observations	12,160	12,160
Mean(Outcome)	0.229	0.218

Notes: Sample and outcome definitions match main-text Table 3. Specifications include ConsPUMA and year fixed effects and omit the time-varying covariates included in the main specification. The reported sample size is based on the same event-study treatment panel described in the main-text Empirical Strategy section: N=12,160 ConsPUMA-year cells. Standard errors clustered at the ConsPUMA level are reported in parentheses. Sources: American Community Survey microdata via IPUMS USA (Ruggles et al., 2025); SOI policy enactment data compiled from Poverty & Race Research Action Council (2026).

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Precision and Attenuation for the No-Voucher-Proxy Sample

OSA Tables 8 and 9 report the precision and attenuation-sensitivity calculations for the no-voucher-proxy sample; the corresponding discussion appears in the Alternative No-Voucher-Proxy Sample section above.

OSA Table 8 *Precision of Mobility Estimates for the No-Voucher-Proxy Sample*

	Point Estimate	95% CI	Mean(Y)	U.B. Effect (%)
Poverty + Rent Burden	-0.002	[-0.023, 0.019]	0.317	5.9%

Notes: Post-treatment average effect estimate from Table 2, Panel B, with corresponding 95% confidence interval (CI). N=12,160 ConsPUMA-year cells in the event-study treatment panel. The *U.B. Effect (%)* column reports the maximum implied effect in percentage terms, given by dividing the upper bound of the CI by the sample average outcome. Sources: American Community Survey microdata via IPUMS USA (Ruggles et al., 2025); SOI policy enactment data compiled from Poverty & Race Research Action Council (2026).

OSA Table 9 *Attenuation Sensitivity, No-Voucher-Proxy Sample*

	Hypothetical Disclosure Share			
	50%	75%	90%	100%
Poverty + Rent Burden	11.8%	7.9%	6.6%	5.9%

Notes: The maximum implied-effect bound (in percentage terms) from Table 8 is rescaled by a hypothetical disclosure share. N=12,160 ConsPUMA-year cells in the event-study treatment panel. The exercise is mechanical and does not estimate an effect on the treated; see the Attenuation Sensitivity section above for full discussion. Sources: American Community Survey microdata via IPUMS USA (Ruggles et al., 2025); SOI policy data from Poverty & Race Research Action Council (2026).

OSA Table 10 *SOI Policies and Household-Level Mobility*

	(1) Any PI	(2) PI $\geq$ 50%	(3) Poverty + Rent Burden
Panel A: Event Study Estimates			
$t = -3$	-0.015 (0.019)	-0.050* (0.026)	-0.011 (0.017)
$t = -2$	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.027)	-0.017 (0.015)
$t = -1$	-0.038** (0.019)	-0.031 (0.027)	-0.020 (0.016)
$t = 1$	0.015 (0.015)	0.011 (0.019)	-0.012 (0.012)
$t = 2$	0.007 (0.014)	0.003 (0.020)	0.005 (0.013)
$t = 3$	-0.005 (0.013)	-0.001 (0.017)	0.016 (0.013)
Panel B: Post-Treatment Average Effect			
Source of Income Policy	0.005 (0.011)	0.004 (0.015)	0.003 (0.010)
Pre-Treatment Joint Sig. Test P-Value	0.183	0.191	0.602
Observations	12,160	12,160	12,160
Mean(Outcome)	0.265	0.223	0.259

Notes: Mobility at the household level is defined as all residents reporting moving in the prior year. Columns correspond to three alternative definitions of households potentially affected by SOI policies. In Column (1), the sample is restricted to households which report receiving protected income (PI) from SSI or welfare payments; in Column (2), the sample is restricted to households for whom PI income accounts for 50% or more of their total household income; in Column (3), the sample is restricted to households with rent burdens of 41% or more in which all residents have incomes below the poverty line. The reported sample size is based on the same event-study treatment panel described in the main-text Empirical Strategy section: N=12,160 ConsPUMA-year cells. All specifications include ConsPUMA and year fixed effects and the time-varying covariates listed in the notes for Table 3 in the main text. Standard errors clustered at the ConsPUMA level are reported in parentheses. Sources: American Community Survey microdata via IPUMS USA (Ruggles et al., 2025); SOI policy enactment data compiled from Poverty & Race Research Action Council (2026).

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

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